Abstract
Introduction
Computer systems are becoming increasingly pervasive, being deployed in consumer-oriented products such as mobile phones, PDAs etc to safety-critical systems such as car engine control, avionics etc. Such increasing pervasiveness has led to a corresponding increase in our reliance on these systems to continually provide correct services, in spite of external perturbations, such as security intrusions, faults etc. In other words, we want such systems to be dependable [13] .
There is no single approach for developing a faulttolerant program(e.g., [2] , [8] , [15] , [16] , [11] ) In [11] , the authors analyzed the complexity of designing failsafe fault tolerance (i.e., efficient design of fail-safe fault tolerance), whereas, in this paper, as a matter of contrast, we analyze the problem of designing efficient fail-safe fault tolerance. We focus on transformational approaches, whereby an initially fault-intolerant program is transformed into a corresponding (fail-safe) fault-tolerant one [2] , [8] , [15] . For such approaches, it is very desirable that the properties of the initial faultintolerant program is preserved in the corresponding fault-tolerant program in the absence of faults. In other words, it is desirable for the fault tolerance components to be transparent in the fault-tolerant program. This means that, in the absence of faults, the fault-tolerant program behaves as the fault-intolerant one (thus preserving its properties), but in the presence of faults, the fault-tolerant program handles the faults. However, there are design issues that may end up having an impact on whether the properties are preserved or not. In this paper, we will consider two such issues, namely (i) the assumed fault model, and (ii) the read/write constraints. We focus on two important properties of the fault-tolerant programs, namely accuracy and completeness [8] . Accuracy implies the ability of a program to avoid false positives (i.e., wrongly flagging existence of an error), while completeness is the ability of the program to avoid false negatives, (i.e., detect every error). We refer to these two properties as detection efficiency of the fault-tolerant program. Whenever it is clear from the context, we will just refer to detection efficiency as efficiency.
In the design of a fault-tolerant program, it is common practice to develop a fault model which the program is supposed to handle. In a formal sense, a fault model F affecting a program p can be seen as a program transformation [5] . Such a fault model can be factorized along two dimensions, namely (i) a local dimension, and (ii) a global dimension. Voelzer [18] calls the local dimension an impact model, and the global dimension a rely specification. The impact model specifies the additional faulty behavior of the system, whereas the rely specification dictates the extent of the faulty behavior. For example, an impact model may specify that "nodes may fail by crashing", whereas the rely specification will specify that "no more than t nodes may crash". The impact model causes an "enlargement" of the system's behavior, while the rely specification constrains that "enlargement".
Distributed programs have read/write constraints imposed on them. In a similar manner, read/write constraints are imposed through encapsulation. This inability to read/write certain variables has not only an impact on the properties of the resulting fault tolerance, but the complexity of designing fault-tolerant programs when there are read/write constraints is very high [11] . Thus, it becomes important to be able to determine the properties of the resulting fault-tolerant program.
Three commonly studied fault tolerance levels, namely (i) fail-safe fault tolerance (ii) non-masking fault tolerance and (iii) masking fault tolerance, can be designed through the addition of error detection (a.k.a., detectors) and error recovery mechanisms (a.k.a., correctors) [2] . Specifically relevant for this paper is that it is both necessary and sufficient to add detectors to a program to ensure that the resulting program never violates safety in presence of faults, i.e., to design failsafe fault-tolerant programs [2] .
The main goal of this paper is to analyze (i) the impact of an assumed fault model on the design of efficient fail-safe fault tolerance, and (ii) the impact of read/write restrictions on the design of efficient failsafe fault tolerance. Very often, to develop a faulttolerant program, a programmer adopts a defensive programming style to ensure that the system never violates safety in the presence of faults, leading to the program to trigger false positives [14] . These false positives may reduce the efficiency of the program, since recovery actions will then be triggered, and the program spends more "time" recovering. Another problem is that of false negatives, which can seriously threaten the safety of the program in the presence of faults. These problems are not easily addressed, requiring extensive knowledge of the program and/or extensive experience on the programmers [14] . The notion of accuracy and completeness is analogous to the definitions of accuracy and completeness of Chandra and Toueg [4] .
In this paper, we first formalize the problem of adding (detection) efficient fail-safe fault tolerance to an initially fault-intolerant program. We then show that, in the presence of a general fault model (as defined later in the paper), it is impossible to add efficient fail-safe fault tolerance. We also show that it is impossible to add efficient fail-safe fault tolerance when there are read/write constraints defined. Consequently, we study some of the possibilities to circumvent these impossibility results. We develop a framework that allows us to study and relate various existing research in trying to circumvent this impossibility result. In so doing, we further identify several potential research areas arising as a result.
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we provide the formal underpinnings of our paper. In Section 3, we explain the role of detectors in fail-safe fault tolerance addition. In Section 4, we explain the problem of adding efficient fail-safe fault tolerance to a fault-intolerant program, and study the complexity of solving the problem in presence of a general fault model. Section 5 provides some potential solutions to some variants of the efficient fail-safe fault tolerance addition problem. In Section 6, we analyzed the problem of designing efficient fail-safe fault tolerance in presence of read restrictions imposed on processes. In Section 7, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition to solve the problem. We conclude in Section 8
Formal Preliminaries
In this section, we summarize the formal terminologies that will be used through out this paper.
This work assumes an interleaved execution semantics, i.e., state transitions are atomic events and an execution is regarded as a linear sequence of states. We assume a shared variables communication model, i.e., processes communicate with each other by writing data into memory locations accessible by the receiver. Syntactically, a program will be represented as a set of guarded commands, and semantically, the program is interpreted as a state transition system. 
Programs Program in Guarded Command Notation

Read/write Constraints
In this section, we identify how read/write constraints impact on the transitions a process can take. Write restrictions. Given a transition (s 0 , s 1 ), it is easy to determine which variables need to be written to for the transition to take place. If there is a variable v such that the value of variable v in state s 0 (denoted by v(s 0 )) is different to that when in state s 1 , i.e., v(s 0 ) = v(s 1 ), then it means that variable v has to be written to for transition (s 0 , s 1 ) to take place. The write restrictions then imply checking that the transition of a process only write to variables that the process can.
Denoting by w i the set of variables that process p i can write to, then p i cannot use these transitions:
Read restrictions. It appears that all variables need to be read for a transition to take place. When read restrictions are imposed on a process for certain variables, then transitions have to be grouped. Specifically, when a given transition is being considered for inclusion or exclusion from the program, the transition cannot be considered on its own. Rather, a set of transitions need to be considered. This can be best illustrated through an example. Consider a program with two processes p i and p j . Process p i has a variable i, while process p j has variable j. Process p i (resp.p j ) cannot read variable j (resp. i). Each variable has domain {0, 1}. Now, if process p i wants to include transition ( i = 0, j = 0 , i = 1, j = 0 ), then it needs to include transition ( i = 0, j = 1 , i = 1, j = 1 ) too, so that the need to read variable j is irrelevant from p i 's point of view. In case only one transition needs to be included, then it becomes important for p i to be able to read variable j so it can decide which transition to take.
Denoting the set of variables process p i can read by r i , for a given transition (s 0 , s 1 ), the set of transitions that need to be considered together with (s 0 , s 1 ) is given by:
Later, we will show how the fact that set of transitions (rather than individual transition) needs to be considered impact on the design of efficient fail-safe fault tolerance design.
Specifications
A specification for a program p is a set of computations which is fusion-closed. A specification S is fusion-closed iff the following holds for computations α and β:
A computation c p of p satisfies a specification S iff c p ∈ S, otherwise c p violates S. A program p satisfies a specification S iff every computation of p satisfies S.
Intuitively, a fusion-closed specification allows a program to make decisions about future state transitions by looking at its current state only, i.e., the history of the state sequence is encoded within a state. Fusionclosed specifications are non-restrictive in the sense that every specification which is not fusion-closed can be transformed into an equivalent fusion-closed specification by adding history variables. It was further shown how this transformation can be efficiently done in [6] .
Alpern and Schneider [1] have shown that every specification can be written as the intersection of a safety specification and a liveness specification. A safety specification demands that "something bad never happens" [12] . Formally, it defines a set of "bad" finite computation prefixes that should not be found in any computation. Since we are mainly interested in detectors, we focus on safety specification, and present a definition here.
Definition 1 (Safety specification): A specification S of a program p is a safety specification iff the following condition holds: For every computation σ that violates S, there exists a prefix α of σ such that for all state sequences β, α · β violates S.
The notion of a finite computation of not being "bad", i.e., the possibility to extend it to remain in the specification, is captured by the definition of maintains.
Definition 2 (Maintains): Let p be a program, S be a specification and α be a finite computation of p. We say that α maintains S iff there exists a sequence of states β such that α · β ∈ S.
A safety specification can thus be represented by a set of computation prefixes that should not occur in any computation of the program, i.e., prevent invalid prefixes from occurring. However, to ensure that no computation displays such prefixes, the program needs to keep track of the whole execution history so as to be able to decide if such prefixes are about to occur. Detecting such invalid prefixes becomes computationally expensive.
However, if the specification is fusion-closed, rather than keeping track of computation prefixes, the program only needs to keep track of the current state before deciding on whether to proceed. Formally, this translates into keeping track of only invalid transitions (or bad transitions), rather than invalid prefixes.
Definition 3 (Bad transition): Let p be a program, SSP EC be a safety specification and α be a finite computation of p. We say that transition (s, s ) of p is bad for SSP EC iff α · (s, s ) violates SSP EC.
It has been shown that any specification that is not fusion closed can be transformed into an equivalent one that is fusion-closed [10] , through the addition of history variables. Calculating these transitions can be achieved in polynomial time in the size of the state space of the program. Gaertner and Jhumka [6] showed how to circumvent the problem of requiring fusionclosed specification to minimize the expansion of the state space due to the fusion closure requirement. Also, note that the notion of satisfies deals with infinite computations, whereas maintains deals with computation prefixes.
Fault Models and Fault Tolerance
A fault model precisely describes the way in which components of the system may fail. Fault models have been categorized into different domains [17] : time faults, and value faults. Traditional stopping faults cannot lead by themselves to a violation of safety. To violate a safety specification, a system must exhibit one of the disallowed computation prefixes. The standard value faults from practice (i.e., bit-flips, stuck-at faults) can directly or indirectly lead to a violation of safety. Formally, a fault model for a program defines a set of transitions for the program. Faults that can directly cause a violation of safety will be called strong faults, while those that cannot directly violate safety will be called weak faults. A general fault model is one that consists of both a weak fault model and a strong fault model.
We provide the definitions below. 
Detectors: Role and Design
In this section, we will briefly preview the role of detectors in the design of fault tolerance, and subsequently review the basis underpinning their design. Arora and Kulkarni [2] showed that a model of program components called detectors is necessary and sufficient to establish fail-safe fault-tolerance in the context of fusion-closed specifications. The main idea of the result is to use detectors to simply "halt" the program in a state where it is about to violate the safety specification, i.e., "halt" the program in a safe state.
An important prerequisite for this sufficiency result is that specifications are fusion-closed. Fusion-closed specifications allow to characterize a safety specification as a set of disallowed "bad" transitions (instead of a set of disallowed computation prefixes). Note that, under our fault model assumption, a bad transition can be both a program transition or a fault transition.
Definition 9 (bad transition
Under such a fault model, for a program to remain safe, the program needs to avoid being in a state where safety has already been violated. In other words, this means that checks need to be performed before transitions are executed to ensure that the program does not end up in safety violating states. This translates into checking whether the transitions can lead to a safety violating state. The check is performed by evaluating a predicate which enables the correct transitions, and disables the bad program transitions. Observe that fault transitions can occur at any time, and cannot be disabled, unless fault avoidance techniques such as system redesign are used. The predicate is implemented using a program component called a detector, which is defined below (Def. 10). As we have mentioned earlier, design of detectors has been usually achieved through experience and intuition, as mentioned in [14] , [2] .
Addition of Efficient Fail-Safe Fault Tolerance
In this section, we will first define the problem of adding efficient fail-safe fault tolerance to an initially fault-intolerant program.
Efficient Fault Tolerance Addition
Definition 11 (Addition of Efficient Fail-Safe Fault Tolerance):
Given a fault-intolerant program p, a general fault model F , and a safety specification SSP EC, design a program p such that E1. Every computation of p is a computation of p in the absence of F . E2. Every computation of p is a computation of p in the absence of F . E3. In the presence of F , p satisfies SSP EC.
If such a p exists, then we say that p solves the efficient fail-safe fault tolerance design problem.
The first two conditions characterise the efficiency issue that we address in this paper. Since the faultintolerant program may have been tested for performance and high efficiency, conditions E1 and E2 ensure that, in the absence of faults, the fail-safe faulttolerant program p retains the same high performance of p. A program p satisfying the above conditions is said to solve the efficient fail-safe fault tolerance addition problem. The first two conditions implies that the fault tolerance mechanisms are transparent, i.e., if no faults are present, then p behaves exactly as p, hence pays no "price". On the other hand, the third condition says that p extends p in being fail-safe faulttolerant, which p is not.
We now present our first contribution of the paper.
Theorem 1 (Impossibility): Given a fault-intolerant program p, a general fault model F , and a safety specification SSP EC. It is impossible to design a program p such that p solves the efficient fail-safe fault-tolerance addition problem.
Proof. Since it is always possible to design a fail-safe fault-tolerant program p by strengthening the guard of each action of p with the predicate "false", thus giving the empty program, the proof of impossibility will be based on showing that it is impossible to devise such a p that simultaneously satisfies the first two conditions (E1 and E2)) and the third condition (E3).
Given: a fault-intolerant program p, general fault model F , and a safety specification SSP EC.
Prove: There is no p that can solve the efficient fail-safe fault tolerance addition problem.
The proof will consist of two parts: P1. If a program p satisfies the first two conditions of the efficient fail-safe fault tolerance addition problem (E1 and E2), then p cannot satisfy condition E3. P2. If p satisfies E3, then it cannot satisfy E1 or E2.
Here, we prove the first part of the proof, i.e., proof P1. We make two assumptions.
Assumptions: 1) Assume p satisfies E1 and E2.
2) Assume that p satisfies E3. We will prove this by contradiction, i.e., if p satisfies E1 and E2, then it cannot satisfy E3, or vice versa.
We also make use of the following: Given a program T , the set of reachable states of T is denoted by Reachable(T ), and is defined as Reachable(T ) = {s:S T |s occurs in some computation of T }. We denote the set of states reachable by a program T in presence of faults F by Reachable(T ,F ), and is defined as Reachable(T ,F )= {s:S T |s occurs in some computation of T in presence of F }. then the set of computation of p is not equal to set of computation of p . The proof is based on the fact that all three requirements cannot be simultaneously satisfied. Thus, it is impossible to solve the efficient fail-safe fault tolerance addition problem under a general fault model. There can be several reasons behind that impossibility result. We will investigate some of the possible reasons in the next section, and identify potential solutions to some variants of the efficient fail-safe fault tolerance addition. We survey the field of fault tolerance synthesis to provide potential approaches to circumvent the impossibility result.
Possible Attempts at Circumventing the Impossibility Results
In this section, we study several possible ways of circumventing this impossibility results. In fact, we relate several existing work in various areas of fault tolerance with possible ways to circumventing the impossibility result.
Weaker Fault Model
One of the problems with finding a program p that solves the problem of efficient fail-safe fault tolerance design is the fact that a general fault model is too strong. Such a fault model allows the specification to be violated by fault actions alone. Given that a general fault model is composed of a non-empty weak fault model and a non-empty strong fault model, choosing to solve efficient fail-safe fault tolerance addition in a weak fault model makes the problem solvable. In fact, Jhumka et al. [8] developed a theory, and associated polynomial-time algorithm that transforms an initially fault-intolerant program into an efficient fail-safe faulttolerant one. The fact that a fault transition cannot directly violate safety allows all the states reachable in absence of faults to be retained. Hence, efficient fail-safe fault tolerance can be achieved in presence of a weak fault model only.
Fault-Safe Specification
In this section, we focus on the concept of fault-safe specification, independently introduced by Kulkarni and Ebnenasir [11] , and by Jhumka et.al [9] . For fault-safe specification, a fault cannot in itself cause a violation of safety. A fault can only disturb the state space in such a way such that subsequent execution of program transitions lead to a violation of safety. Examples of fault-safe specification abound in the area of fault tolerance, such as consensus, mutual exclusion, 2-phase commit etc. For example, in mutual exclusion, a fault cannot force a second process to access the critical section. However, a fault can modify the value of a lock (i.e., reset the value of the lock), causing another process to believe the critical section is free, which then access it, violating safety.
Reinterpreted in our context, a fault-safe specification does not admit a strong fault model, i.e., there is no strong fault model for such a specification, and a program satisfying the specification. Thus, such a specification admits only a weak fault model, and from section 5.1, solving efficient fail-safe fault tolerance addition under a weak fault model is possible, and can be achieved in polynomial time.
Developing a Weaker Specification
One problem that contributes to the impossibility result is the fact that the requirement that the initial fault-intolerant program and the fail-safe fault-tolerant program to display exact behavior in the absence of faults is strong. This fact is highlighted in the proof, whereby a potential fail-safe fault-tolerant p attempts to match the steps of the fault-intolerant program p, however needs to avoid those potential tricky states where a strong fault can cause them to violate safety. Hence, there are two possible ways of weakening the efficient fail-safe fault tolerance addition. The first possibility is to weaken the requirement of p and p to have exactly matching steps in the absence of faults. One way to achieve it is to either request p to display a subset of the computation set of p, such that p displays only those computations that avoid those potentially tricky states from where a strong fault can cause it to directly violate safety. Such a line of approach has been adopted by Arora and Kulkarni [2] .
Another way is to allow p to display as many computations as possible as p does, but allow it to "divert" to a different computation whenever it is reaching a tricky state. In the extreme case were all states s ∈ Reachable(p) are tricky, it involves rewriting the new program from scratch, else the only fail-safe fault-tolerant program is the trivial "null" program. This is an area for future work. An interesting work in relation to this is the work in the area of computer security on edit automata [3] . Bauer et.al [3] introduces the concept of effective enforcement, whereby an (or group of) action ac in p is replaced by another (or group of) action ac' that is syntactically different to ac, but semantically equivalent to it. For example, an action x := x + 2 can be replaced by the following three actions: y := x; y := y + 2; x := y, where ; denotes sequential execution. An interesting area for investigation is the implication of effective enforcement in fault tolerance, especially for real-time systems.
The second way of weakening the problem specification is to require exact behavior in the absence of faults from both the fault-intolerant program p, and p , but not requiring p to be fail-safe fault-tolerant. This means that, in certain circumstances, it is alright if safety is violated. This situation can occur in nonsafety-critical systems, where it is more important to maintain a certain performance than to maintain system safety.
Choosing Another Fault Tolerance: Safe Stabilization
From the previous section, the problem specification may be weakened by not requiring the program p to be fail-safe fault-tolerant. On the other hand, one may require p to satisfy some other fault tolerance property, while still satisfying safety. Ghosh and Bejan [7] addressed this issue by developing a framework for safe stabilization. Stabilization is the property of a program to satisfy liveness (as opposed to safety) even in presence of faults. Safe stabilization is the property of a program to satisfy both liveness and safety in presence of faults. However, for a program to satisfy safe stabilization, it needs to be designed conservatively, so as to satisfy certain conditions under specific fault models. As future work, we plan to investigate the conditions under which safe stabilization is realistic, i.e., the program can display a "big" enough computation set.
Issues of Read/Write Constraints
In this section, we analyze the problem of designing efficient fail-safe fault tolerance when read/write constraints are imposed on variables. We now present another main contribution of the paper: Notice here that we consider a weak fault model, since a general fault model would have automatically led to the impossibility. Recall that a weak fault model does not cause violation of safety (in contrast to strong fault models), but they may ultimately lead to violation of safety. Proof. The impossibility proof will be based on the issues of distribution. The proof of impossibility will be based on showing that it is impossible to devise such a p that simultaneously satisfies the first two conditions (E1 and E2)) and the third condition (E3) of the problem of designing efficient fail-safe fault tolerance. Given. a fault-intolerant program p, a weak fault model F w , and a safety specification SSP EC. Prove. there is no program p that solves the efficient fail-safe fault tolerance design problem.
We provide a construction for p . Assume a process p j in p has to include a transition (s, s ). Thus, the problem is then that p j either has to include set(r j )(s, s ) or exclude the whole set. Assume that (s, s ) is not a bad transition, but however set(r j )(s, s ) contains a bad transition, which we denote by δ. Now, note that program p contains δ since p is fault-intolerant. Thus, for fail-safe fault tolerance, p j has to exclude set(r j )(s, s ). Thus, by excluding set(r j )(s, s ), it means that the set of reachable states of p is a subset of that of program p, i.e., reachable(p ) ⊂ reachable(p). Thus, the set of computations of p is a subset of that of p, violating Now, assume that instead of excluding set(r j )(s, s ), p j includes set(r j )(s, s ) in it transition set. The set of reachable states by p remains the same as that of p, but p j will contain the bad transition δ, thus making p fault-intolerant.
Thus, p cannot satisfy E1, E2, E3 at the same time. Hence, no such p exists.
An Example Illustrating the Impossibility
In Figure 6 .1, there are two processes involved, namely p 1 and p 2 . The first two values in each state represent the values of two variables x and y respectively, which belong to process p 1 . The last value is that of variable z, which belongs to process p 2 . Process p 1 (resp. p 2 ) cannot read variable z (resp. x). The specification for the program is (x + y + z ≤ 4).
Based on this specification, the bad transition in program P (which is fault-intolerant) is (0, 1, 3) → (2, 0, 3) . In the fail-safe fault-tolerant program P', if the bad transition is removed, since the transition is executed by process p 1 , which cannot read variable z, then there are two transitions that are affected, namely transitions (0, 1, 3) → (2, 0, 3) and (0, 1, 1) → (2, 0, 1) . When transition (0, 1, 1) → (2, 0, 1) is removed, some computation in the absence of faults will not longer be possible, hence the original behavior is not preserved.
Circumventing the Impossibility Result
We have shown that it is impossible to solve the problem of designing efficient fail-safe fault tolerance when read/write restrictions have been imposed on processes. However, there are various ways to circumvent the impossibility. In this paper, we focus on identifying a special case where it is possible to design efficient fail-safe fault tolerance.
Critical Variables
We observe that, in the proof of impossibility, the problem is caused by the fact that a variable that cannot be read by a process can lead to transitions that are good as well as bad. Thus, to solve the efficient fail-safe fault tolerance design problem, it is crucial that all the critical variables can be read by all the processes.
Conclusion
In this paper, our main contributions are: (i) we have shown that, under a general fault model, addition of efficient fail-safe fault tolerance cannot be solved, (ii) we have investigated several strands of work that are relevant to allowing us to circumvent the impossibility result, (iii) we proved that it is impossible to design efficient fail-safe fault tolerance if restrictions are imposed on processes' ability to read variables, and (iv) we have identified a necessary and sufficient condition that allows efficient fail-safe fault tolerance to be designed, even when read restrictions are imposed.
